Revisiting Insider Trading in the Debt Markets: Lessons For Debt Investors and Members of Committees in Bankruptcy Cases
For some participants in the debt and credit markets, insider trading risks seem like a problem for someone else. There is some statistical basis for that assumption; the law of insider trading has been developed largely through cases involving the equity markets. There is no basis, however, for a sense of immunity. The Securities and Exchange Commission's recent settlement involving Barclays Bank PLC and Steven J.
Landzberg, a former proprietary trader for Barclays' U.S. Distressed Debt Desk, sends a signal that the SEC is prepared to bring even novel insider trading cases in the debt markets. See SEC v. Barclays Bank PLC, Litig. Release No. 20,132 (May 30, 2007) (the "Settlement"). While the Settlement involves important lessons for holders of debt securities, such investors should particularly take these lessons into account when considering joining a creditors' committee.
The SEC's complaint that resulted in the Settlement is not focused on an isolated incident. Instead, the Commission contends that, through Barclays' participation on a half dozen official and unofficial creditors' committees, the firm received material, nonpublic information about the debt issuers involved. None of the legal issues implicated in the Settlement will be tested in the courts.
Barclays and Landzberg settled the proceedings for payments, respectively, of $10.9 million and $750,000. Landzberg also consented to a bar from service on any creditors' committee in a federal bankruptcy case involving an issuer of securities.
The Settlement coincides with significant change in the debt and credit markets. Once dominated by banks and multi-service securities firms, these markets have seen an influx of new participants, including hedge funds and other "buy side" investors. company's stock price increased 34 percent after the transaction was announced) and the allegedly improper profits garnered ($3,785 by one defendant; $2,897 by the other).
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Members of committees in bankruptcy cases should take particular note of the Commission's allegation that Barclays' trading breached fiduciary and other duties of trust or confidence. In addition, the SEC complaint expressed concern that Barclays and Landzberg allegedly failed to disclose their trades to the sources of the material, nonpublic information -the creditors' committees and issuers -or to the U.S. Trustee, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts or trading counterparties.
In a settled proceeding, the SEC is not compelled to prove each element of an insider trading violation. By looking at the final product of a settlement negotiation, it also is not possible to determine what pressures affected the outcome. Nonetheless, the broad scope of trading addressed in the Settlement could be read to mean that one principal concern for the Commission in this case was an overall failure to maintain adequate ongoing control over material information received in Barclays' capacity as a committee member. S. 646, 658 (1983) ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.").
Second
breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information."
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The SEC complaint and the Settlement were brought squarely under the misappropriation doctrine. The SEC's complaint alleges that, in connection with its service on the six creditors' committees, Barclays executed either agreements or bylaws that included confidentiality commitments. The purported material, nonpublic information allegedly was used in breach of the duties assumed by Barclays by virtue of its membership in each of these committees.
The challenge presented in the Settlement -managing the receipt of information under a confidentiality agreement -is one that appears repeatedly in the debt and credit markets (and not solely through involvement with official and unofficial creditors' committees). A credit agreement often affords lenders access to operating information beyond that which the company has disclosed publicly; such a credit agreement routinely requires the lender to keep this information confidential. In a number of contexts, distressed issuers will wish to share material information with investors and will press to do so under a confidentiality agreement.
The Settlement reinforces that all investment staff must appreciate that, given the breadth of the misappropriation doctrine, receiving material information under a confidentiality agreement effectively restricts securities trading (unless effective procedures shield the person making the investment decision from access to the material information and, if the investor serves on a creditors' committee, such procedures are not inconsistent with any applicable bankruptcy court trading orders).
That risk can be assumed even with an oral confidentiality agreement; it need not be a formal non-disclosure agreement. The key point is that the legal risk changes dramatically when the material information is subject to any form of confidentiality agreement. Big boy letters should be a useful tool in enhancing marketplace liquidity. In the absence of authority directly on point, marketplace participants have operated on two common sense notions. The first is that sophisticated investors are not defrauded when they are told information will not be shared with them and proceed with the transaction nonetheless. In fact, there are reported analogous decisions that dismiss securities fraud claims by sellers who were on notice that the purchasers would not disclose certain information. 7 Second, while Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act limits contractual provisions that waive compliance with the federal securities laws, 8 when a big boy letter is entered into by similarly-situated parties, it provides a contemporaneous record that should allow a regulator or a trier of fact to determine that there is no basis to conclude that anyone was defrauded in the first place.
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It is likely that, after this Settlement, big boy agreements will continue to be used by institutional investors, particularly in credit markets involving transactions that do not involve securities. The Settlement provides scarcely any detail regarding the context surrounding those "few instances" which Barclays utilized big boy letters. Certainty is vital to securities markets; the Settlement does not enhance the certainty regarding the use of big boy letters in those markets. See , e.g., Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073 , 1077 -79 (10th Cir. 1993 ). See , e.g., Harsco Corp. v. MHC Holdings Corp., 91 F.3d 337, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1996) .
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See Rule 10b5-1(c)(2) (providing that an entity may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of securities was not made on the basis of material, nonpublic information if the entity demonstrates that: (i) the individual making the investment decision was not aware of the information and (ii) the entity "had implemented reasonable policies and procedures . . . to ensure that individuals making investment decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of material nonpublic information"). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2) (2007 Greenfield and Blue River Capital.
12
In Blue River, the Commission alleged that a broker-dealer failed to take adequate steps to sequester information associated with service on three creditors' committees. Specifically, the Commission claimed that an oral direction to delegate trading to another employee within a small firm with shared space did not constitute reasonable procedures to prevent the illegal use of material, nonpublic information.
As the scope of activity in the debt and credit markets widens, there is a growing circle of entities with access to market-sensitive information. The outcomes in the Settlement and the Blue River proceeding underscore the need for every organization to be able to:
(1) ensure that the institution is aware when part of the organization is receiving material, nonpublic information from a public company; (2) restrict trading while the firm is aware of this information; or, in the alternative (3) maintain and document procedures that separate the information from individuals who are charged with investment decisions; and (4) develop systems to ensure compliance with applicable bankruptcy court orders. Both settlements also provide a reminder for entities to assess how they can demonstrate that these procedures were in place and were implemented.
The law of insider trading was developed predominantly in the equity markets. The constant surveillance of equity markets makes it likely that the principal focus of future insider trading developments will be in those markets. At the same time, the Settlement 11 See, e.g., In re Refco, Inc., 336 B.R. 187, 196-97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006 ) (discussing the underlying concern of a breach of a committee members' fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to all unsecured creditors by profiting from, or enabling selected creditors to profit from, nonpublic information obtained as a result of committee membership), citing In re Federated Dep't Stores, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 288, 1991 WL 79143 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991 (recognizing ability of creditors' committee members to trade in the debtor's securities so long as such members institute procedures for screening personnel engaged in trading from personnel involved in committee work).
In re Van D. Greenfield and Blue River Capital LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 52,744 (Nov. 7, 2005 ) ("Blue River").
